accidents happen very fast. The time that elapses between
liquefaction being detected, if it is detected at all, and the vessel
capsizing is in some cases only a few minutes. This leaves very
little time for remedial measures. It also leaves very little time
for the safe evacuation of the ship, and such accidents are often
associated with tragic losses of crew members.”
DNV GL’s description of the “phenomenon” of liquefaction
earlier this year was produced before the cause of the Bulk
Jupiter loss was known, but the classification society anticipated
the findings of BMA with uncanny prescience.
The Bulk Jupiter sank on 2 January. It had previously loaded
46,400 tonnes of bauxite at the Malaysian port of Kuantan and
had then sailed for the port of Qingdao in China. The vessel
was relatively young — less than ten years old — and it had
been strengthened for heavy cargoes. It entered the Bahamas
register in 2011 and had dry-docked in Shanghai in May 2014,
completing its Intermediate Survey in July of the same year. A
Certificate of Compliance to the Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes
(IMSBC) Code was issued in April 2014. In short, the vessel was
well-managed, operated responsibly by a reputable owner —
Gearbulk — and was registered with a respected Flag State.
So there were no obvious red flags associated with the vessel
prior to its arrival in Malaysia. Instead, BMA found that the
source of the loss was the state of the vessel’s bauxite cargo
when it was loaded.
The Bulk Jupiter was fixed under charter to carry a cargo of
bauxite and arrived alongside the berth on 16 December 2014,
but loading was not completed until 30 December due to
frequent and prolonged periods of exceptionally heavy rain.
While the rain was falling, hatch covers were closed but the
cargo itself was not covered. Moreover, Kuantan port received
the bauxite from a nearby open cast mine on open-topped
trucks.
“The loads were dumped onto the quayside and loaded into
the holds by grab using the ship’s own cranes,” said the report.
“Comments provided by one deck officer who left the ship
before departure indicated that the trucks had no covers when
transporting cargo to the port, stockpiles were left uncovered as
was cargo on the quayside pending loading onboard — including
during periods when loading was interrupted by rainfall.”
BMA said that although the ship had been provided with a
‘Form For Cargo Information for Solid Bulk Cargoes’ issued by
the shipper stating that the cargo comprised particle size
‘2.5–500mm 70–90%’ and moisture content at shipment of ‘10%’,
it was observed that “these figures were identical to the
Individual Schedule for bauxite in the International Maritime
Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code”.
The BMA report added:“The form was signed as issued on
11 December 2014. It is difficult to conclude that the form represents anything other than indicative information rather than
specific characteristics of the cargo.”
During the course of the registry’s investigation, test results
were taken from samples of the commodity loaded onto the
Bulk Jupiter during the loading period of 17–30 December. The
test report indicated that the average moisture content from ten
lots was 21.3%. Results of moisture testing were also obtained
from hold samples taken from another ship which was still
loading at the time of the loss of the Bulk Jupiter.“Of 45 results
the highest as-tested moisture content was 18.46% and the
lowest 12.99%,” said BMA.
“A further ship which had departed the port on the
1 January with a similar cargo of bauxite became aware of the
sinking of the Bulk Jupiter on the evening of 3 January. Weather
conditions did not permit examination of hold contents until the
morning of 5 January when cargo in all holds was found
slumped, with surface pools of free water, and described as
‘moving to port and starboard in a jelly-like fashion’. This ship
was diverted to the closest port of refuge and all cargo was
discharged.”
Taking the evidence from the three ships, BMA concluded
that the cargoes were loaded in a condition which was “not in
accordance with the Individual Schedule for bauxite in respect of
moisture content.”
The report added:“The ship was well managed by a company
with an excellent and proactive safety record, and the structural
condition of the ship was found to be satisfactory at all Flag,
Port State, Class and Company surveys and inspections. In the
absence of any evidence to suggest catastrophic structural failure
and in the light of the facts that there was no collision or
grounding or extreme weather conditions, the conclusions
drawn by the investigation point to loss of stability through
cargo liquefaction.”
Unlike most of the other reports into bulk carrier losses due
to liquefaction — many of which were not made public without
a great deal of pressure and which in some cases took far too
long to be released even to victims’ families, as reported
previously by DCI – BMA not only released its report promptly,
it also admirably called for reforms to prevent further losses.
“Seafarers have a right to expect that the cargoes loaded
onto their ships are properly declared,” said the report. “In this
case it cannot be argued that the declaration received on board
accurately reflected the cargo being loaded. While seafarers
should be aware of potential safety issues this paper does not
argue that anyone holding a cargo watch should be expected to
be able to assess the conformity of a cargo by sight. The
suitability and conformity of a cargo is the clear responsibility of
the shipper and not the ship.”
According to BMA, although the Individual Schedule for bauxite specifies a range of moisture content, the list of
information to be provided to a Master does not include the
requirement for the dimensional characteristics of the cargo. “In
fact, and despite the fact that the schedule does specify a range
with an upper limit of 10%, even moisture content and TML only
needs to be communicated ‘in the case of a concentrate or
other cargo which may liquefy’.
“Large amounts of bauxite have been safely transported
around the world for many years although some concern was
raised by P&I Clubs regarding the potential of liquefaction of
bauxite cargoes in 2012. The [Bulk Jupiter loss and subsequent
casualties] may have arisen through a combination of record
rainfall and a higher ratio of powder/lumps in the bauxite cargo
than the schedule specifies, but it is clear that the consequences
justify the importance of the need for improved control over the
loading of bauxite.”
“Bauxite is a Group C cargo and the schedule has no advice
on special precautions to be taken. Of particular relevance is
the fact that no weather precautions are specified. This is a clear
deficiency in the schedule.”
BMA, which will present its findings to the IMO’s Sub-
Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers’ (CCC)
second session over 14–18 September, would like the IMO to
consider reclassifying bauxite as a Group A cargo which can
liquefy. Alternately, the authority will request that the sub-
Committee treat bauxite “as a cargo for which the Master
should be automatically provided with the test certificates under
4.3.1 of the Code” and, where such test certificates are not
supplied, are deficient in any respect “or have any other cause
for concern” bauxite should then be treated as Group A cargo.
BMA also called for test certificates issued for bauxite to
clearly set out the actual proportions of lumps and powder of
the cargo to be loaded as determined through testing and for
additional weather precautions to be specified.
BMA’s call for regulatory reform is no lone voice. DCI has long campaigned for tighter regulation and oversight of the
world’s deadliest shipping trades — the carriage of minerals that
can liquefy from South East Asia to China when loading occurs
during the monsoon season. Dimitris Dedepsidis,Team Leader
for Plan Approval and Ship Type Expert for bulk carriers at DNV
GL in Greece, also agreed that cargo liquefaction “has not yet
been properly accounted for by international regulations,” and
was of major concern for shipowners.
“Some of the terminals that handle mineral ores such as
nickel ore and iron ore fines, are located in tropical areas,” he
added. “Especially during the rainy season, the cargo’s moisture
level can therefore be significant, and may be close to or even
exceed the transportable moisture limit of the specific cargo. If
such cargo is loaded, it significantly increases the risk of cargo
liquefaction during the ship voyage, which may eventually lead to
a serious stability problem or affecting the structural integrity of
the ship.”
DNV GL found that an ore carrier’s tank boundaries were
not always assessed for the possibility of cargo liquefaction. “If it
does occur, the pressure on the non-horizontal cargo hold
boundaries can increase by a factor of two or even three,” said
So¨nke Pohl, Key Account Manager and Ship Type Expert for bulk
carriers at DNV GL in Germany.
To help customers tackle the issue, DNV GL has worked
with several shipping companies to prepare a guideline for the
design and operation of vessels with bulk cargoes that may
liquefy. The intention of this guideline is to raise the awareness
of the risks of cargo liquefaction on ships, and to describe what
mitigating actions may be taken to reduce such risks.
Hopefully, when the IMO’s CCC 2 meets, it will be equally
proactive as DNV GL and take urgent steps to amend the
Schedule for bauxite by making recommendations to the IMO’s
Maritime Safety Committee so it can then amend the IMSBC Code. If not, yet more lives could be lost on South East Asia’s deadly mineral trades.